Voices Heard In Jury Argument: Litigation And
The Law School Curriculum
Michael E. Tigar*
Why does Hawkins v. McGee' really belong in casebooks?
Not, I suggest, because poor young Hawkins-whose doctor
botched the operation and left him with a hairy hand-could care
less whether the damages for breach of the contract to give him
a "like new" hand were a pittance or some fraction of a pittance.
Yet this is why Hawkins is a favorite in contracts courses. No,
the real reason can be found hidden in the notes to the case in
the Hamilton, Rau & Weintraub contracts casebook.2 Hawkins's
lawyer lost his negligence claim because he could not find a medical expert to testify for the plaintiff, so he had to settle for contract
damages.
The following tale illustrates what is missing in legal education. My mentor, Edward Bennett Williams, told me of a motion
argument he made as a young lawyer. He staggered into the old
District of Columbia Court of General Sessions with two books
under each arm. (This was before the days of photocopiers, when
law books had to be carted to court.) A courthouse habitu6, a
lawyer whose office was no doubt the telephone booth in the
courthouse hall, looked at him disdainfully and intoned, "Throw
away those books, boy. Get yourself a witness."
I am going to talk about facts. I want to gather up some
strands of discourse and weave them into an argument that law
schools should be doing more teaching about litigation. Just
recently, I published these words in the Columbia Law Review:
Facts are mutable because we never see them in litigation.
We see instead their remnants, traces, evidences, fossils-their
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shadows on the courthouse wall. The witnesses recount: They
have perceived, do now remember, can express and want to tell
the truth, more or less. Things-paper, hair, bones, pictures,
bullets-parade by, each attached to a testifier who alone can
give them meaning. At proceeding's end, the advocate will try
to impose some order on all of this, and convince the trier that
it makes a certain kind of picture.
Legal ideology, in the form of statements called rules, is
more or less flexible depending upon the legal issue at stake
and the fineness with which lawgivers have woven. An advocate must appreciate how large are the open spaces in the rules
at issue, and have at hand alternative formulations to match the
adversary's-and the judge's-moves.
The openness or malleability of legal rules is the essence of
traditional law teaching. It was and is the battleground of debate
among schools of jurisprudential thought: the fact of "what is"
and the postulate of "what ought."4 Professors struggle in basic
courses to give students the skills with which to weave arguments
and analyses of where the law might go and of what it might do.
In practice, litigators can and do criticize rules from stances within
and without the rules' ideological framework. But usually they
do so only after they figure out what the rules really mean.
Something is missing from our teaching, and we sense it.
Students are weak on analysis of facts, even when the facts come
partly predigested in a case file or memorandum assignment. (My
colleagues remark on examination performance in a similar vein.)
I believe that law schools are turning out students who cannot deal
well with facts because the dominant teaching method gives the
students no appreciation of how facts are captured and of how their
evidences are brought to court. If all we see in the trial process
are the shadows of facts in the past, then appellate opinions in the
casebooks give us only the trial facts put through a judicial
Cuisinart to adorn the judges' opinions.
I have come to this view gradually since joining a law faculty.
Several years ago, I taught an appellate practice seminar. In one
3.

Tigar, Book Review, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 255, 256-57 (1990) (reviewing J. Lws.
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of our cases, the Ninth Circuit had reversed a judgment of dismissal and sent the case back for trial.' The defendant, Francisco
Martinez, asked me to represent him at the trial.
Martinez, a native of Southern Colorado, received his law degree from Minnesota in 1971 and became a Reginald Heber Smith
Fellow in his hometown of Alamosa. As a result of his militant
activity on behalf of Chicanos and Native Americans, he was subjected to threats and his office was burned. In 1973, he was indicted on seven counts related to possessing unregistered
explosives and mailing letter bombs. Before Martinez was
brought to trial, however, he left Colorado to live in Mexico under
the name Jose Reynoso-Diaz.
On September 3, 1980, Martinez crossed the border at
Nogales, Arizona, using his Reynoso-Diaz identity. He was arrested on immigration charges. He told the arresting and ptocessing officers his name was Reynoso-Diaz, and he may have
repeated this statement to the magistrate at arraignment. Martinez
pleaded guilty to the petty immigration offense and was sentenced
to ten days in jail and return to Mexico. The immigration officers
checked his fingerprints while he was serving the ten-day sentence.
When they discovered that he was wanted in Colorado under the
name of Francisco Martinez, he was sent there to face the bombing
charges.
Martinez went to trial on three counts.' During the trial, the
judge suspected that certain individuals were conspiring to intimidate the jurors, so he held a clandestine meeting in his hotel
room one night with the prosecutors and several government witnesses.7 He urged the prosecutors to provoke a motion for a
5. United States v. Martinez, 785 F.2d 663 (9th Cir. 1986), appeal after remand,
837 F.2d 900 (9th Cir.), opinion superseded by 855 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1988). The court
of appeals panel in the initial opinion had little doubt that Martinez was guilty. However,
in the later opinion, the jury found otherwise on two of three counts, and the court of
appeals found insufficient evidence on the third count.
6. See United States v. Martinez, 667 F.2d 886 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 1008 (1982). In January 1981, the district court severed four of the original seven
counts. Martinez went to trial on three unsevered counts, one alleging conspiracy and
the other two alleging possession of explosives and mailing of explosives.
7. Id. at 888. The judge believed that certain spectators, sympathetic to the defendant, were conspiring to create an atmosphere of intimidation in the courtroom. His
reason for not inviting defense counsel to the meeting was his suspicion that one of the
defense counsel might be involved in the conspiracy to intimidate the jury. Id. The
Tenth Circuit found the judge's "belief' to be totally unfounded. Id. at 890 n.6.
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mistrial from the defense. The prosecutors obliged and the judge
granted the motion. Unfortunately for the judge and the
prosecutors, the meeting did not remain secret, and, on appeal, the
Tenth Circuit held that the prosecutors could not retry Martinez
on the first three charges.8
Martinez was tried in Colorado for a second incident of mailing a letter bomb, and the jury acquitted him. The government
then charged him with mailing a third alleged letter bomb, but the
district court eventually dismissed the charge on motion of the
government.9 Two weeks after the third case was dismissed, the
government brought the Arizona indictment, charging that
Martinez's use of the name Jose Reynoso-Diaz was a false statement when made to government agents and a perjury when
repeated to the magistrate. The district court dismissed the indictment as a vindictive prosecution, and my seminar unsuccessfully
fought the government's appeal in the Ninth Circuit. Now what
were we to do?
With the Dean's approval, I took a band of five law students
to Tucson for the trial. Our defense was to be that Martinez
adopted the Reynoso-Diaz identity to live in Mexico until the furor
died down in Colorado and he stood a chance of getting a fair
trial on charges of which he was innocent. You can characterize
this defense as "necessity," but we preferred to speak of lack of
criminal intent, since the standard was easier to meet.
As we waited for the prospective jurors to file into the
courtroom the morning of trial, the prosecutor moved in limine to
exclude all references to Martinez's desire to avoid an unfair trial
in Colorado; the trial judge granted the motion. My students, who
had labored over the legal theories and who had helped prepare
the witnesses we were going to use, were aghast.
"Can he do that?" one of them asked.
"Well," I said, "he is a federal judge. He has the only handle
on the jack."
"What are we going to do?"
8. Id. at 890. The court of appeals found that since the defense was induced into
joining the motion for mistrial by judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, double jeopardy
precluded further prosecution on the three charges.

9. See Martinez v. Winner, 771 F.2d 424, 433 (10th Cir. 1985), modified in part
and rehearingdenied in part, 778 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1985).
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"We are going to pick a jury and try this lawsuit. We need
jury instructions on the elements of the offenses." (For this, law
school teaching had prepared our band of warriors.) "And we are
going to look to the jury and the court like we deserve to win.
We will rest right after the government. I will sum up the
government's failure of proof. But more than that, I need to prove
from the government's witnesses that Martinez really lived the
Reynoso-Diaz identity, that it was reasonable for him to use that
name, and therefore that the name was not 'false.' We want jurors
who will forgive us for not putting the defendant on the stand.
We will hope that the prosecutor undertries his case. I am going
to bet he thinks we will put on a defense and that he can come
back on cross-examination or rebuttal and fill in the gaps in his
proof. We will encourage him in that view."
We went to trial. During the cross-examination of government witnesses, most of whom were immigration and other law
enforcement officers, I brought out facts that we needed to argue.
For example, the witnesses testified that Martinez had a Mexican
passport in the name Jose Reynoso-Diaz and a Mexican cartilla
militar and that the United States Embassy in Mexico had issued
him an entry visa one year before. These facts bolstered the idea
that he was using the Reynoso-Diaz name consistently.
The legal rules at issue in this case were fairly clear: falsity,
criminal intent, and hornbook law on using another name. In addition, the defendant had the right not to testify, and the judge
would tell that to the jury. I cannot recreate for you the atmosphere in that courtroom. Martinez and I had almost waived a jury,
thinking that the judge who had earlier dismissed the indictment
would be favorably disposed. His grant of the motion in limine
was only the first evidence that waiving a jury would have been
a major error on our part.
When we rested and the judge told us what instructions he
was going to give to the jury, the prosecutor's confidence rose
even higher. My summation was dominated by the theme of jury
empowerment, woven into different arguments. I wanted to impress upon the jurors the importance of analyzing the government's
case. I had three major objectives as I stepped before the jurors
for the last time. First, I had to gain the jurors' attention.
Second, I had to put forward the facts that bespoke reasonable
doubt. Lawyer rhetoric may carry jurors for a half hour of
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deliberation, but beyond that jurors need solid arguments on which
to rely. An effective summation dredges up pieces of evidence
from the trial and little nuggets from the jury instructions and sets
them out for jurors to take back to the jury room with them.
Third, I had to explain why Martinez did not take the stand.
I have used themes from my summation in an earlier article
on jury argument and will not repeat them here.' I began something like this:
Members of the jury, the prosecutor summed up to you in
so matter-of-fact a tone of voice that it sounded like this case
leaves little room for you to wonder. And the interesting thing
is that when I get done, and after the prosecutor talks some
more, the judge is going to tell you about the law. And he
will use that same matter-of-fact tone of voice. Now I do not
blame the judge. He sees a lot of trials. It is like the famous
English author G.K. Chesterton said about the English judges,
"They are not cruel. They just get used to things."
But you and I know that there is something very important
and special about this case, and that when all the talking is done
you are going to decide the fate and future of this young man,
Francisco Martinez.
After two and one-half days of deliberation over evidence that
had taken less than two days to put on, the jury acquitted on the
two felony counts of making a false statement. They convicted
Martinez of perjury, but the prosecutor had failed to introduce any
evidence that the alleged falsehoods were material, and the Ninth
Circuit reversed on a brief written by my students."
Was this "jury nullification"? I do not think so. The legal
rules at issue had enough flexibility that a not guilty verdict is
plausible and defensible. One might ask, echoing Dean Mark
Yudof's concerns in a recent article, whether a "genuine" but
"wrongheaded" voice-mine-had persuaded the jurors to act in
a way that diluted legal rules.' Again, I doubt it. In my experience, supported by some academic studies, jurors bring to their
task a great sense of responsibility that able advocates and careful
10. See Tigar, Jury Argument: You, the Facts, and the Law, LIGATION, Summer
1988, at 19.
11. In addition, we proved systematic exclusion of Hispanics from federal juries. Although the court of appeals did not address this issue, the district judges in Arizona have
changed their system as a result of our challenge and others like it.
12. Yudof, "Tea at the Palaz of Hoon": The Human Voice in Legal Rules, 66 Tax.
L. Rzv. 589 (1988).
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judges can enhance. 3 Would the trial judge have decided the case
differently? You bet. Indeed, those who remember Harry
Kalven's and Hans Zeisel's trailblazing work, The American Jury,4
know that juries often acquit when judges would not, although the
frequency of this jury behavior varies with the type of offense.
To some commentators, this observed gap between the way
that judges and juries typically behave means that juries are more
lawless, or less smart, than judges. In terms of ultimate results,
trial courts have at their disposal certain legal devices to help ensure that juries' decisions are not totally arbitrary: directed verdicts, j.n.o.v.'s, and new trials are available to judges in all
instances except acquittals in criminal cases. But these devices
are phrased in terms that leave no doubt that under most circumstances the jury is given a broad range of permissible discretion. 5 This discretion is reinforced by substantive law rules
phrased as "good faith," "ordinary prudence," or "meeting of the
minds."
Anyone who thinks otherwise should look to the Texaco, Inc.
v. Pennzoil, Co. 6 jury instructions, which an appellate court has
blessed and in which renowned scholars of the law had a significant hand. The jury could find that there was a contract to
buy Getty Oil without there having been a formal memorandum
containing all the terms. Although the court gave the jury only
the most general sort of guidance in its task, that generality was
compelled by the flexibility of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Two truths-that most of the rules governing ordinary litigation are flexible and that the jury has discretion-are significant
because these two issues make up much of the litigation that most
lawyers do. Yet these twin truths are downplayed in most law
school curriculums. Why is this so?
Legal commentators offer two possible answers. First, most
lawyers are not litigators; second, ninety percent of civil cases and
nearly that many criminal cases settle.
13. See, e.g., Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REv. 744

(1959).
14. H. KALVEN & H. ZEisEL, THE AmERICAN JURY (1966).
15. See M. TiGAR, FEDERAL APPEALs: JURISDIcrlON & PRACnCE §§ 5.03, 5.06 (1987).
16. 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988). Dean Mark Yudof was foremost among the scholars.
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I have two responses to these arguments. First, lawyers who
only "do deals" and ignore the prospect of litigation do not serve
their clients. Lawyers should ask if the file provides a means by
which the lawyer can recreate the negotiations should the whole
deal wind up in court. A dramatic example of just what can happen in negotiations occurred when the Texaco board of directors
met several times to discuss Getty Oil. During these meetings,
some directors took notes containing such phrases as "derail this
train" and "get Liedtke."
"These were not," as I argued during a mock retrial of the
case, "the scribblings of Mafia chieftains assembled in the tasteless
splendor of a Vegas hotel. No, this all took place in the august
and serene precincts of Texaco's boardroom. These were 'respectable' gentlemen. And of course, there might have been more of
these traces of intention to interfere had not somebody at Texaco
decided to help things along by shredding a batch of vital documents after they had been called for by the lawyers on the other
side."
Second, the often-quoted figure-I have used it myself-that
ninety percent of civil cases settle is seriously misleading. Settlements do not take place due to sudden outbreaks of lawyer good
will. Lawyers settle cases intelligently only if they have evaluated
the range .of risk of plausible jury verdicts, and this requires having
thought the case through. I tell young lawyers that in order to
keep in mind the facts and legal theories they know and the ones
they need to find, they should write out a draft summation as soon
as they are retained on a case. 7
More significantly, the ninety-percent settlement figure includes cases that are not "true" litigation. 8 United States District
Judge John Coughenour has examined his own docket and
eliminated such things as student loan cases, in which the court
is being used as a collection agency; the spate of Social Security
administrative law judge review proceedings provoked by the
Reagan administration; meritless prisoner petitions; and civil forfeiture cases, in which the outcome is foreordained but in which
there must be a judicial order. Of the cases that remain-the real
cases-two-thirds settle and one-third will be tried. Attorneys
17. See Tigar, supra note 3, at 256.
18. Presentation by Judge John Coughenour to the Section of Litigation, American
Bar Association (Aug. 3, 1989).

STRASB URGER LECTURE

1990]

often wait until the conclusion of discovery and dispositive motions before settling-that is, until both sides have constructed
litigation models.
Not all cases that are tried will be appealed. Of the cases
that are appealed, most will be affirmed, and almost all the jury
verdicts that are challenged for want of evidence will be affirmed.
In sum, the process or prospect of litigation touches the life
of almost every lawyer. Yet law school teaching is dominated by
attention to the results of litigation as embodied in appellate
opinions. To be sure, you cannot master the process without
paying attention to rules. The rules help predict a result. But for
the lawyer in an office faced with a client sobbing out a story,
some other truths make a greater difference.
You must realize that the facts that matter will not announce
themselves, either in the office or later in court. A lawyer must
find facts by searching for evidence of them. The facts of the
only case that matters-your client's-will not jump from an appellate opinion, a professor's hypothetical, or a writing instructor's
memo assignment. Usually you must leave your office to get
them. And when you have rounded up their "evidences," you
must turn each one over in your hand to see whether or not it is
arguably admissible under a rule of evidence. I say "arguably"
admissible because the so-called rules of evidence are themselves
overlapping and open textured, and appellate courts give trial
judges great deference in applying them. 9
Only after you have taken this process of searching and
analyzing quite some distance will you be able to apply legal rules
in the sense that traditional law school teaching emphasizes. You
will be able to take out your initial draft of a summation and work
it over. Only then can you say with Oliver Wendell Holmes that
you "know" the law. Indeed, you will be able to say that you
have a brighter, better, and surer view of the law than Holmes and
most of the legal realists who were his early, summer friends and
sunshine admirers. And you will have gained a set of insights
about the range of plausible results under ostensibly consistent
legal rules that the traditional law school curriculum does not provide.
19.

M.

TioAR,

supra note 15, §§ 5.05, 5.08.
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Most of us know by heart Holmes's most famous aphorism:
"The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law."2 In the same 1897
address, Holmes also paraded his "bad man" theory of the law,
arguing that, while legal rules rest on moral principle, the function
of the law as such is not to make moral judgments. The rules
are erected for a bad man, who keeps his bargains only because
state power will make it unpleasant for him not to.
The asserted moral relativism of this position has been castigated. In revisionist circles, there is a lot of Holmes-bashing
going on." It is certainly true that viewing rules as disjointed entities apart from their human consequences "can make a stone of
the heart."22 The obvious corollary of Holmes's observation is that
if one can be sure the state will not make unpleasant consequences,
one is free to act as one pleases. From such a world view comes
Carl Sandburg's remark that the hearse horse snickers at the
lawyer's funeral. I will return to this theme later. We need more
talk about legal ethics in law schools and in less hallowed places.
Holmes's words revive our foreboding that Bentham was right
in saying: "It is the judges ... that make the common law. Do
you know how they make it? Just as a man makes laws for his
dog. When your dog does anything you want to break him of,
you wait till he does it, and then beat him for it."24 In more ex20. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 461 (1897).
21. See Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism,41 STAN. L. Rev. 787 (1989) (arguing
that the different elements of Holmes's work come together as pragmatism); Vetter, The
Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 CALiF. L. REv. 343 (1984) (reviewing the
erosion of Holmes's reputation as a liberal-minded realist). The view of law as morally
relativistic fits nicely with the idea that lawyers are entitled to assert their client's "legal"
claims by abusing rules that are difficult to enforce, heedless of other consequences. More
subversively, if one can be sure that the state will not make unpleasant consequences,
one is free to act as one pleases. This freedom in turn leads to discovery abuse in busy
courts and "sewer service" in debt actions. See Tuerkheimer, Service of Process in New
York City: A Proposed End to Unregulated Criminality, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 847, 848
(1972) (defining "sewer service" as the process whereby false affidavits of service are
filed in court). Hence there is the smug confidence that the law will never touch the
white collar criminal.
22. W.B. YEATs, Easter 1916, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.B. YEATS 179 (1977).
23. Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does a hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away?
C. SANDBURG, The Lawyers Know Too Much, in THE CoMPLET POEMS OF CARL SANDBURG
189 (1963).
24. J. BmTHEAM, Truth versus Ashhurst, in 5 WORKS 231, 235 (1843).
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treme form, the critical legal studies view is that judges wear robes
because they have nothing on underneath them.
The legal realists, however, made a great deal of Holmes's
words.' Llewellyn embraced Holmes's theory, but warned as
early as 1931 that "there is less possibility of accurate prediction
of what courts will do than the traditional rules would lead us to
suppose. ' In The Bramble Bush, Llewellyn was more blunt: "If
wishes were horses, then beggars would ride. If rules were results,
'
there would be little need of lawyers."27
Jerome Frank, in a
famous dissent, reminded us that "[a] legal system is not what it
says, but what it does." He quoted Llewellyn: "It is the substantive rule only as it trickles through the screen of action-which
counts in life."2
Llewellyn and the other legal realists had strong views on
what the rules should be, but they insisted that you first had to
find out what the rules were.29 Jerome Frank, when he became a
judge, often made this distinction as he struggled to apply principles with which he disagreed but that his oath compelled him to
respect. "[O]ur private views," he said, ". . . are as irrelevant as
our attitudes towards bimetallism or the transmigration of souls."3
The generation of which the realists were a part helped us to
see two things clearly: First, the law masks its true rules behind
rhetorical constructions;3' second, legal ideology is more flexible
than some had supposed. These two insights became keys to the
social activism of my own generation of lawyers. They drove me,
in a real sense, to become a litigating lawyer.
25. See Vetter, supra note 21, at 345-46.
26. Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 1241.
27. K. LLEwELLYN, THE B rnt BUSH 18 (2d ed. 1951). Were time no object and
discursiveness thought a virtue, I would compare-as others have--legal realism and critical legal studies, even to the similarity of academic response to these two movements.
28. United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 662 (2d Cir. 1946)
(Frank, J., dissenting).
29. See Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 1223 ("But there is no reaching a judgment as
to whether any specific part of present law does what it ought, until you can first answer
what it is doing now.").
30. Antonelli Fireworks, 155 F.2d at 666 (Frank, J., dissenting); see also Skidmore
v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co., 167 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1948) (majority opinion written by Judge
Frank). In his Harvard article, Llewellyn counts Leon Green among the realists. See
Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 1226 n.18. Green, of course, thought the jury a malign institution that should be abolished. See L. GIMN, JUDGE AND JURY 395-417 (1930). Still
he would not have doubted that the study of litigation was important.
31. See, e.g., T. ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937).
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The realists made us ask which of the many voices that purported to describe legal rules were authentic, and which 'voices
were being shut out of the debate. We aimed, in Llewellyn's
words, "to cut beneath old rules, old words, to get sight of current
things.

32

In a provocative essay, Professor Julius Getman has taken this
discussion a step further.3 3 He asks us to consider the tone of
"voices" as well as the words they speak. He tells us of the
lawyer's "professional voice," the language of legal argumentation
to tribunals. This voice pays the law the compliment of taking
its verbal forms seriously. He tells us of "critical voice," which
perhaps echoes Llewellyn and Frank. This voice knows that legal
rules are not all they seem. "Scholarly voice" ranges wider for
its insights, perhaps even to nonlegal disciplines, yet remains objective. "Human voice," the one Professor Getman finds missing
in law schools, is "language that uses ordinary concepts and
familiar situations without professional ornamentation in order to
'
analyze legal issues."34
35
In his essay, Professor Getman tells us of State v. Williams,
"a case involving a Native American couple found guilty of the
negligent homicide of their child because they failed to bring him
to a physician when he became seriously ill."36 In a law school
class discussion of the case, a black female student from South
Carolina sympathetically discussed the parents' dilemma. She
noted that in the South, black patients regard doctors and hospitals
as alienating and uncaring. Professor Getman concludes that if
this woman had represented the couple, "they would not have been
convicted." His "other thought was how little law school teaches
students about37 the importance of presenting the client's case in
human voice.
Dean Yudof, responding to Professor Getman, sums up his argument this way, "The Indian child is dead, and the parents could
have prevented this calamity by ordinary prudence."38 Dean Yudof
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Llewellyn, supra note 4, at 1223.
See Getman, Voices, 66 Tax. L. REv. 577 (1988).
Id. at 582.
4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 (1971).
Getman, supra note 33, at 583.
Id.
Yudof, supra note 12, at 601.
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worries that a "genuine but wrongheaded human voice" might persuade a jury to acquit and thereby weaken the legal principles that
deter and punish negligent homicide. He also argues, "The problem is not just to do justice in this particular case by taking account of sympathetic human voices; the problem is to articulate a
legal standard that transcends the particular case and to examine
the particular circumstances of the defendants within the context
of that standard."39
I suggest that Dean Yudof and Professor Getman are debating
a closed issue, and that the Williams case can help us see why
this is so. Professional, critical, scholarly, and human voice all
find a place in law teaching today. A diverse faculty contains embodiments of all these voices. In different ways, we give our students the realist's gift of parsing statutes and appellate opinions
to discover the rules and doctrine that lie beneath the rhetoric. We
often, although perhaps not often enough, discuss the human consequence of rules. We pull and twist the facts around, compelling
our students to confront the ways in which a rationale they have
put forward will not cover the cases for which they have designed
it.
This form of education illuminates true rules and uncovers
buried doctrine. It does little, however, to help law students understand how rules move through Llewellyn's "screen of action."
It says everything about how to evaluate results and almost nothing
about how to bring them about.
I offer as an exhibit the homicide case about which Dean
Yudof and Professor Getman traded words. The Williams couple
were Native Americans in King County, Washington, which includes Seattle. Mr. Williams was the stepfather of his wife's child
by a former marriage, a seventeen-month-old boy. Mr. Williams
had a sixth-grade education; Mrs. Williams had completed eleven
grades. They both worked while Mr. Williams' eighty-five-yearold mother cared for the children. The young boy had an
abscessed tooth that became gangrenous; he developed pneumonia
and died. Both parents, the court of appeals found, loved the
child.
Under Washington law, a finding of negligent homicide requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant failed to exercise
39. Id. at 601-02.
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ordinary caution, and that the failure proximately caused the victim's
death. A Washington statute requires parents to provide necessities
for their children. These legal principles trace contours familiar to
lawyers in almost any jurisdiction. It does not, therefore, repay one's
effort to probe the wisdom of these settled and noncontroversial rules.
The appellate case report does not say whether the Williams had
appointed or retained counsel. It does make clear that their lawyer
waived a jury in this homicide case, and that a judge found the defendants guilty as charged. On appeal, their lawyer argued neither that
the evidence was insufficient nor that the reasonable doubt standard
had been misapplied. The appellate court, on its own motion, made
such inquiries on its way to affirming the trial court.
If the Williams were suspicious of authority figures like doctors
and hospitals before this litigation began, their tableau of alienation
now must be more richly detailed. Waiving a jury in a homicide
case is almost always wrong; not raising significant arguments on appeal is always professional misconduct. These are not, however, the
significant issues for legal educators. As Dean Yudof starkly reminds
us, the irrefutable core of fact is that the child is dead. It also is
irrefutable that the State wants to impose a criminal sanction. However, it is not irrefutable that the parents could have prevented that
death by ordinary prudence. This conclusion is simply one reached
by a trial judge confronted with inadequate advocacy.
The first lesson law students need to learn from the Williams case
has nothing to do with voices and a great deal to do with ears. They
need to listen to the genuine human predicament of these parents and
to imagine the hundred ways in which evidences of their lives could
be found. The legal rules about negligent homicide are flexible
enough; we can resist Dean Yudof's call to re-examine them. Kalven
and Zeisel have told us that the range of jury results in homicide cases
is wider than in other offense categories.4' And while "human voice"
surely will find its way into a summation, the advocate cannot get
by with an abstract reference to her own world view. Instead, the
advocate must evoke the client's and the jurors' human concerns.
I prepared a mock summation for the Williams case that emphasizes how one could moderate the Washington negligent
homicide law by the use of effective advocacy:
40. H.

KALVEN

& H. ZEISEL, supra note 14, at 68-75.
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Members of the jury, we all have to take an oath to do
what we do in this place. His Honor took one to be a judge.
I took one, and so did this government prosecutor, to be a
lawyer. You took two to sit in that box. One to answer all
those questions we asked of you in voir dire and another to
well and truly try this case and a true verdict render.
In those voir dire questions, I asked you if you would
hesitate to find Mr. and Mrs. Williams not guilty if the government did not prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. You
said, no, you would not hesitate. And I believed you then.
You are sovereign here. The government prosecutor says
he represents "the State." Nonsense. He is just an assistant
district attorney. Right now in this case, you represent the
state. This case is so important that the prosecutor doesn't get
to decide it. Some pathologist doctor who never met this family until their boy died doesn't get to decide it. And I'm going
to say something right now, and if I'm wrong, the judge will
correct me: even His Honor doesn't get to decide it.
What are the facts upon which you may rely? We all heard
Mr. and Mrs. Williams. They did not make a world in which
both parents must go and work long hours just in order to bring
home enough to support a family. They did not make a world
in which there is no child care and in which an eighty-fiveyear-old grandmother, who has great love but sometimes flagging strength, must look after the kids. They did not make a
world in which when you go to the clinic, the doctors and nurses make you sit and wait and then are cold, impersonal, and
uncaring. They did not make a world in which Native
American people have for some good reasons-oh, you might
disagree, but there are some good reasons here in this
evidence-come to distrust doctors. And they did not make a
world in which police and prosecutors intrude on their grief and
try to add to their burden by burning on them the brand of
criminal.
They did not make this world, but you have the power to
do something about it. You are the State. You are the people.
You can say, "No, we will not brand these folks criminals unless you prosecutors show us in your evidence that they had
some other reasonable, human, humane way to turn." You can
say, "We the jury will not let the State lay a hand on Mr. and
Mrs. Williams unless that hand is blameless in the death of that
little boy."
Yes, the human voice may evoke familiar situations by analogy in order to make a point. But human voices heard in jury
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argument must be designed for twenty-four human ears and disciplined in ways that the realists largely ignored, that Professor
Getman has glimpsed, and that critical legal studies commentators
have derided.
A colleague, after reading a draft of my mock summation,
wondered if it were "an appeal for jury nullification." "No," I
say, "and this is the point: the rule itself is so crafted that an
acquittal is defensible in a broad range of factual settings." This
insight and what it truly means to law and lawyering will not
emerge from study of the rule itself or from any imaginable permutation of imagined facts. It emerges only as the rule bursts
through the screen of action.
The realists were concerned with small numbers of ears, two
for trial courts, six for courts of appeals, on up to eighteen for
the Supreme Court of the United States. The realists wanted to
know what "courts" would do; they wanted to reform rules and
judgments. They paid little attention to juries, and indeed there
was dissension within realist ranks as to whether there should be
jury trial at all, at least in civil cases."
Professor Getman has given us a taxonomy of voices, but with
the exception of a couple of references to clinical education and
his own experience, these voices are for professors to use in talking to their colleagues, students, or the practicing bar. The use
of all these voices prepares students to talk back to their professors, and in some measure to argue to judges about points of law,
but that process is inherently incapable of breaking through the
screen of action.
The voices heard in jury argument are "human" in form, but
they can and must be professional, scholarly, and critical in content. The advocate must remind the jurors of legal rules, trace
those rules' limits, and counsel jurors to use insights from lay witnesses, experts, and the jurors' own life experiences.
The voices heard in jury argument treat legal rules holistically,
as part of the social structure, and concretely, as they address the
lives of individual people. Legal rules bursting through
Llewellyn's screen of action show us the diversity of human experience. While we have not done so well in diversifying the
41. At least some realists thought jury trial a peculiar institution, and this may have
led them to undervalue its importance as an object of study. See supra note 30.
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federal bench or the courts of general jurisdiction, jury selection
law has dramatically changed the picture of litigation from forty
years ago. Juries have become more representative. Therefore,
preparation for jury advocacy is necessarily a study of many
voices. As law schools strive towards diversity in the ranks of
students and faculty, they do well to remind themselves of the
pressures for diversity in the legal system as a whole.42
This point was driven home to me as I reread Lloyd Paul
Stryker's classic book, The Art of Advocacy,4 3 based on a series
of fourteen lectures this celebrated advocate delivered at Yale Law
School in 1952-53. Styles of advocacy have surely changed, although the core of Stryker's message remains valuable. Still, all
of Stryker's examples feature white male advocates, politicians,
judges, and (mostly) jurors. Painting a picture of advocacy today
demands a more varied palette.
In speaking of voices heard in jury argument, I am neither
urging that law schools jettison the traditional curriculum nor
counseling that they embrace the now-dominant form of trial advocacy teaching. Until recently, appellate advocacy training and
competitions were often arid exercises in the art of debate. The
facts were predigested and students were not required to wrestle
with a trial record or to build their factual and legal arguments
with primitive but still-useful tools. Much trial advocacy teaching
also had de-emphasized the intellectual challenge of legal issues,
ignored legal ethics, and even relegated most discussion of evidentiary points to the sidelines. Law school faculties, observing these
shortcomings, cited them as reasons to paint trial advocacy teaching and teachers into a comer of the curriculum."
42. See Tigar, Opening Statement: Lawyers, Money, Race, and Gender, LrrGATION,
Fall 1989, at 1.
43. L. STRYKER, THE ART OF ADvocAcy: A PLEA FOR THE RENAISSANCE OF THE TRIAL
LAWYER (1954).
44. The partial and inadequate approach to teaching litigation may be responsible for
the rather negative impressions of the value of such instruction. This means that articles,
such as Cramton & Jensen, The State of Trial Advocacy and Legal Education: Three New
Studies, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1979), may not have much to tell us. I must, however,
acknowledge the value of Carlson, Competency and Professionalismin Modern Litigation:
The Role of the Law Schools, 23 GA. L. REv. 689 (1989), which argues for the place of
litigation study in the law school curriculum and also takes the view that ethical and
historical insight may be deepened by such study. I read the Carlson article at a time
when this essay was well along. While Carlson and I agree on certain basic matters, I
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In a holistic approach to legal education, litigation insights
would enrich and add to the traditional methods and curriculum.
Some law students who have done well with the curriculum as it
is also would excel in this other realm. But many others will find
that learning and listening to voices heard in jury argument, and
seeking a voice of one's own, requires different talents. Adding
this dimension to the law school curriculum gives a new means
by which success can be measured and permits more students to
do well at more things.
I am convinced, as Professor Carlson has argued, that litigation insights deepen the meaning of lawyers' ethical and professional responsibilities.45 Law schools have largely walled off
ethics teaching into a separate course; as a consequence, students
constantly struggle in their attempts to relate rules to reality. The
students' confusion is inevitable if law schools are going to teach
only what rules are and what doctrine is, to the exclusion of what
lawyers do.
Professional responsibility courses do cover material that is essential to legal education, and law schools are now compelled to
offer them in order to remain accredited. But if we look at the
principal criticisms of lawyer behavior today, it becomes clear that
someone is failing somewhere. Lawyers are so anxious to branch
out into business enterprises that they ignore the inherent conflicts
thus created. From American Bar Association debates over ancillary business activities to suits against Texas lawyers in the wake
of bank failures, this behavior cannot be ignored. In addition, representing defendants whose interests may conflict is a continuing
and serious concern in criminal litigation. Perhaps the most common causes of lawyer disciplinary referral are ignoring client welfare through delay and failing to explore legal theories of recovery.
Lawyer incompetence (by which I mean failure to keep up with
developments in the law) has become a subject of major American
Bar Association concern as well.
Judging by the amount of ink and noise, lawyer litigation tactics have degenerated seriously. Sanctions against lawyers for
meritless pleadings, discovery abuse, and related misconduct have
attach little significance to the views of Burger and Kaufman, which he discusses. I have
a rather different view of the nature and function of legal rules, and I take a somewhat
different tack in discussing the significance of ethics, "professionalism," and legal history.
45. See Carlson, supra note 44, at 699-712.
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increased. Courts and bar associations have responded with codes
of lawyer civility.46 I seriously doubt the wisdom or utility of
some remedies that have been proposed, but no one rationally can
deny the mounting evidence of these professional lapses. Law
schools should not shoulder all the blame for, nor accept the burden of correcting, this situation. But they surely have helped
create the problem. We are the ones who introduce students to
the two elements of professional judgment about their behavior as
lawyers. First, we tell them about the nature and function of legal
rules. Second, we describe for them the role of lawyers in putting
those rules into practice.
Traditional legal education still is rooted firmly in the realist
tradition, or more precisely in variants of Holmes's bad man
theory. Law teachers challenge students again and again to focus
on the rule and its application; in the alembic of Socratic discourse, law teachers often boil out human feelings and concerns.
On that point, surely, Professor Getman is right. To the extent
that this is a dominant theme of legal education, particularly in
first-year courses, law schools seem to embrace Holmes's moral
relativism. This relativism is, in turn, disempowering in the sense
that it denies that rules may be moderated through effective advocacy. I submit that relativism is an inherent flaw of legal education that focuses on rules and doctrine to the exclusion of what
lawyers really do and can do.
Traditional legal education is about rule makers and rule
givers. Therefore, it cannot give students the sense of being in a
"profession." There was a time, and John Fortescue wrote of it
in his fifteenth-century treatise, De Laudibus Legum Angliae,47
when lawyers and judges lived shared professional lives. Those
days are gone. At the same time, the economic pressures on traditional professional values are intensifying.48 Expanding law school
46. See, e.g., Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Say. and Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D.
284 (N.D. Tex. 1988); SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS AND TEXAs COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS,
THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREE-=A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM (Nov. 7, 1989).
47. J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIAE (S. Chrimes rev. ed. 1986) (1st ed.
1545).
48. See Friedman, Gordon, Pirie & Whatley, Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in
Silicon Valley: A PreliminaryReport, 64 IND. L.J. 555 (1989); Gordon, The Independence
of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1988).

THE REVIEW OFLITIGATION

[Vol. 9:177

teaching to embrace the sense of "lawyering" as a profession is
indispensable.
Most tellingly, the resolution of ethical problems is best
studied and learned in the theater of action. When you take a case
that may be destined for jury argument and put together an imagined summation, you will necessarily implicate every ethical
concern that now occupies the profession. You cannot begin to
find your summation voice without understanding what it means
to be an advocate, what it means to have that single-minded devotion to a client's cause of which Lord Brougham spoke:
"I once before," he said, "took leave to remind Your
Lordships-which was unnecessary, but there are many whom
it may be needful to remind-that an advocate by the sacred
duty which he owes his client knows, in the discharge of that
office, but one person in the world, that client and none other.
To save that client by all expedient means, to protect that client
at all hazards and costs to all others, and among others to him'
self, is the highest and most unquestioned of his duties."49
Perhaps it is a myth that people can make and exercise intelligent decisions about matters of deep concern to them. If so, it
is a myth for which we have collectively risked a great deal. Principled advocates are engaged every day in empowering people in
ways that sustain the idea that people do have such a capacity.
That is the essence of our profession."
You cannot decide to delve for the fossil remains of facts
without a sense-whether right or wrong-of the limits of advocacy. Have you an honorable cast of mind or a paper-shredder
mentality? My first week in Washington, D.C., Edward Bennett
Williams told me, "All the canons of ethics can be boiled down
to one: When things are tough, and it looks like somebody is
going to jail, make sure it's your client.""1 I do not think I could
49. This famous statement continues. It is reprinted in full in L.

STRYKER,

The Trial

of Queen Caroline,in 2 THE WORLD OF LAW: THE LAW AS LITERATURE 176, 210 (E. London
ed. 1960). My own views were set out in a trial discussed in DISORDER INTHE COURT
147-48 (N. Dorsen & L. Friedman eds. 1973).
50. I do not mean to endorse the artificial idea of autonomy expressed in United
States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 761 (9th Cir. 1989). For thoughts in line with my
own, see id. at 761-74 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (citing Tigar, Foreword-Waiverof ConstitutionalRights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1, 16 (1970)).
51. Edward Bennett Williams's view of the legal profession is set out in E. WI.LIAMS,
ONs MAN-s FREEDOM (1962).
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fully appreciate that aphorism outside the context of lawyers in
litigation.
There is a practical side to this. You, the lawyer, are always
being looked at by the jury. You cannot convince them of the
rightness of your client's cause unless you have impressed them
as a truthful, honorable person worthy of their trust. If you are
caught being sneaky or "too much like a lawyer," your client suffers the consequences. 2
Ethics dead and in books are artifacts. The only ethics that
matter are ethics alive53 and in use. The only way to make ethics
live is to recreate for students what lawyers do and what choices
lawyers make. What will be the portion of legal ideology, expressed as rules, that you invoke for your client's protection?
What theories of the case will you pursue? With what diligence
will you seek them out?
In the end, of course, adherence to these rules will either be
a matter of internal compulsion or will have little if any meaning.
Discovery abuse, misuse of client confidences, leaning on witnesses, and even shredding the occasional document are largely invisible because the courts and bar associations-from surfeit of
work or absence of concern-are doing so little about them.
Holmes's bad man theory arises once again: If the only principled
basis for obeying rules is to avoid unpleasant consequences, then
ethical rules mean nothing and one can argue with a straight face
that one is free to act as one pleases.
Teaching ethics alive in the work of lawyers gives students a
deeper sense of the adversary system's built-in correctives. Perhaps the bar association will not intervene, or the judge's discovery docket may be too crowded to provide relief from Punic
Wars deposition tactics. Unearthing and combatting an opponent's
unprofessional conduct is a lesson learned early in the study of
what lawyers do, and arguing the inferences to be drawn from
spoliation is one of the things voices in jury argument do well.54
52. See Tigar, supra note 42, at 1.
53. B. DUNHAM, Enics DEAD AND ALIVE (1971).
54. Along this line, I moderated a program entitled Dealing with the S.O.B. Litigator
in 1989, available on videotape from the Consortium for Professional Education Videolaw
Seminars of the American Bar Association. This program addresses the problem of unprofessional conduct. For similar discussions in the evidentiary context, see 2 J. WIGMORE,
EviDENcE § 278 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1979) ("[A] party's falsehood or other fraud in
the preparation and presentation of his cause, his fabrication or suppression of evidence
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This is a truer response to ethical obligation than simply
answering the current calls for professionalism. It unites specific
principles with the legal and professional ideology of which they
form the most important part. One may believe or not that the
state and its legal ideology are neutral. But few people, whatever
their jurisprudential outlook, doubt that the maintenance of lawyer
independence holds some promise that the state will obey such
promises of freedom and fairness as its ideology may contain.
The ideology of which these professional rules are a part is
the product of specific social struggles in which lawyers have participated. The ideology cannot be understood well and certainly
cannot make a coherent professional ethos for the lawyer-in-training, without an appreciation of this historical and social context.
Professor Ronald Carlson has spoken of the value of tradition, and
of the example to be drawn from the "heroic tasks" performed by
"litigants and their lawyers."55 I have tested the proportions in
which clients and lawyers should share the accolades for historical
victories in two plays. 6
Indeed, litigation is the ideal arena in which to confront the
legal profession's ideological relativism. Litigators, particularly in
cases touching social issues, see and deal with the ethical implications of conduct-including their own-in a special and informative way. Professor Guyora Binder's brilliant essay on Jacques
Verges, the French avocat who defended Klaus Barbie, the
by bribery or spoliation ....
is receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness
that his case is weak or [an] unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred
the fact itself of the cause's lack of truth or merit."); 2 id. § 291 (contents of a document
may be inferred from spoliation or suppression); 7 id. § 2132 (J. Chadboum rev. ed. 1978)
(opponent's destruction or suppression of a document uniformly held sufficient evidence
of execution to go to the jury).
55. Carlson, supra note 44, at 715.
56. See Haymarket: Whose Name the Few Still Say with Tears (initial performance
at Thome Hall, Northwestern University (Oct. 23, 1987)); The Trial of John PeterZenger
(initial performance at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug, 10,
1986)). In the Haymarket play, Lucy Parsons rebukes Clarence Darrow:
Your lawyer's ego wants you to think you stand at the center of every event by
which the world is changed. Your right to stand there is only because some
brave soul has risked death or prison in the people's cause and you are called
to defend him-or her. When you put law and lawyers at the center of things,
you are only getting in the people's way, and doing proxy for the image of the
law the state wants us to have. The law is a mask the state puts on when it
wants to commit some indecency upon the oppressed.
sc. xi, lines 48-57.
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"Butcher of Lyons,"57 illustrates this point. Verges had served as
counsel to leftist political figures and had authored texts on political case defense. His acceptance of the Barbie case, his courtroom
tactics, and his seeming wish to expiate Barbie's crimes by comparing them to those of imperialist France, raise serious issues for
lawyers-especially for those who profess a radical point of view.
For Verges to step into a courtroom and defend Barbie requires
him to seem to accept many assumptions about the judicial system.
Which assumptions must a litigator truly accept?
Without for now answering this question, I say that the advocate clearly risks trivializing evil by putting it "in context," or of
recapturing Pogo Possum's unhappy malapropism, "We have met
the enemy and he is us." To litigate means learning to face
choices, not necessarily to make them in a certain way.
By gazing into the mirror of the past, we find more than a
turn of phrase to use in jury argument or a trial tactic to borrow.
We see Hamilton risking his health and reputation to defend
Zenger, Otis declaiming against the writs of assistance, the bravura
performance of JoAnn Harris prosecuting Reverend Moon, or the
wily Malone springing the suffragettes from the red-hot coop of a
workhouse in Occoquan. Quietly, and more gently, we walk with
Sir Thomas More as he counseled his successor:
"Master Cromwell, you are now entered into the service of
a most noble, wise and liberal Prince; if you follow my poor
advice, in your counsel-giving unto His Grace, ever tell him
what he ought to do, but never what he is able to do ....

For

if a lion knew his own strength, hard were it for any man to
rule him.""8
I limned the distinction between technical proficiency and
commitment to principle in an article I wrote a few years ago:
I tremble for my profession when I see it inundated by suggestions that advocacy can be reduced to a series of formulae
about lawyer behavior, divorced from the merits of one's cases
and the ideology of the adversary system. I tremble because
such suggestions trivialize the role and social responsibility of
lawyers and because the great advocates of this and every other
57. Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321 (1989).
58. M. TIGAR, LAW & THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 194 (1977).
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time in recorded history have been students of society and not
carnival barkers.59
What lawyers do and have done, so far as it merits retelling,
helps law students to place themselves in a profession that does
more than maximize its income. We are helped by vivid instances
in recent memory of lawyers who decided that money was the only
goal worth chasing. Some of these lawyers dabbled in investment
banking or forgot that public service is not a right to sup at the
public trough, and now they live in Club Fed.
I have gone this far without saying much about the perceived
crisis in litigator competence. The legal education journals have
been full of studies and speeches, referring back to former Chief
Justice Burger and former Chief Judge Kaufman's melancholy appraisal of trial lawyer quality. ' This complaint has been echoed
by other judges and lawyers. I think much of the criticism is
misplaced, and that the judiciary bears at least as much responsibility for the perceived problems as lawyers do.6' A federal
judiciary that bewails the state of lawyering, but which in the next
breath trivializes the constitutional right to effective counsel and
forgives the most egregious sort of prosecutorial misconduct, is not
the most reliable guide to the ills of legal education in litigation
skills.
Helping students learn to listen well, so that each may discover a voice within that will do for jury argument, must justify
its place in the law school curriculum on broader terms than "trial
competence." Law schools' hurried curricular responses to particular crises have not been notably popular or successful. More
significantly, I hope I have shown that the litigator's approach to
59. Tigar, Talk-Show Advocacy (Book Review), LITIGATION, Fall 1985, at 61, 62
(reviewing S. HAMLIN, WHAT MAKES JURIES LisN: A COMMUNICATION EXPERT LOOKS AT THS
TRIAL (1985)).
60. See, e.g., Carlson, supra note 44; Cramton & Jensen, supra note 44.
61. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986) (prosecutor's improper,
inflammatory closing argument did not warrant issuance of habeas corpus because defendant was not deprived of fair trial); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (fact
that counsel was given only twenty-five days to prepare for trial, that counsel was young
and inexperienced in criminal matters, and that charges were complex and serious did
not warrant finding of ineffective assistance); Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) (standard of "reasonably effective assistance" and restating requirement of
prejudice for award of relief from ineffective assistance). Cases such as these trivialize
not only the importance of advocacy skills, but also adherence to elementary ethical standards.
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legal rules provides valuable professional, scholarly, critical, and
human insights into the actual content and action of legal ideology.
I confess that some of this is wistfulness, brought on by looking out at student faces seemingly frozen in attitudes of torporfor the first canon of trial tactics is alertness. Lloyd Paul Stryker
tells of Sir Charles Russell, K.C., rebuking a junior barrister in
court:
"What are you doing?"
"Taking a note."
"What the devil do you mean by saying you are taking a note?
Why don't you watch the case?"'6
I tell students in South Africa, where there are no jury trials,
"Watch his Lordship's pencil. Even when there is no pencil and
no lordship."
What, then, are our tasks? The University of Texas has an
impressive array of litigation offerings. Courses, seminars, intramural and intermural advocacy competitions-all are supported
at levels that compare favorably with any law school in America.
We must maintain and enhance these endeavors and learn from
their successes. I suggest, however, that we must take three further steps.
In the first year of law school, all students must acquire the
view of law that comes only from appreciating the litigation
process. Some law schools have a course with such a title, for
which Professor Anthony Amsterdam has developed extensive
materials.63 This course may put too much pressure on the already
overburdened first-year curriculum. I believe that our law school
could profitably divide its five-unit Civil Procedure offering into
two courses of two and three units. The two-unit Fall course
would focus on the voices of litigators and the ears of juries, while
tracing the rule-bound structure of the litigation process. The
three-unit Spring course would cover personal jurisdiction, res
judicata, the Erie' doctrine, and the other parts of civil procedure
that more closely resemble the "stuff' of traditional first-year
teaching. If we do not identify litigation as the basic substance
of civil procedure, we are in danger of falling into the trap that
62. L. SRaYKER, supra note 43, at 45-46.
63. A. Amsterdam, Materials for the Lawyering Program (Spring 1989) (unpublished
manuscript).
64. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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other law schools have dug for themselves. They have a course
by that name, to which are assigned people who would rather be
teaching constitutional law, and who therefore do so when they
think no one is looking.
Were this proposal thought too intrusive, students could be offered a series of lectures discussing the litigation process in addition to their legal research lectures. In five fifty-minute sessions,
we might at the very least have a decent claim to supplant the
impenetrable prose of The Bramble Bush and the dated rhetoric of
Lloyd Paul Stryker. As part of this process, and to develop the
idea that good lawyers learn to listen well before they try to talk,
at least one legal writing assignment should involve a witness interview.
From this modest beginning, we could construct a "litigation
track" or group of courses that emphasize not only useful skills,
but also the genuine insights into the legal process that litigation
provides. Included within these insights is the need of every
litigator for a broad general and legal education. Such an approach distinguishes us from those who would uncritically embrace
advocacy training as something divorced from the ideological, social, and historical context in which the adversary system has
developed.
I would not try to draw a map until I thought there were at
least a few who wanted to brave the journey. Above all else, I
want legal teaching to convey the excitement of this profession of
ours. For me, that excitement has never consisted solely in the
desire to learn technique. I have often thought that our profession
should forswear its Olympian pretensions, perhaps borrowing
Lear's words on seeing the poor and homeless: "0, I have ta'en/
65
Too little care of this!,
I was once taken to task for my rather old-fashioned and
"philosophical" view of litigation training. I replied to my critic,
and I say to you in closing, "I was trying to say that in litigation
as in love, technical proficiency without passion is not wholly
66
satisfying.,
65. W. Shakespeare, King Lear, act II1, sc. iv, lines 33-34.
66. Response from Michael E. Tigar to Fred H. Bartlit, Jr., reprinted in
Winter 1986, at 62.
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